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RESEARCH ARTICLE
The Two Faces of Security in Hybrid 
Political Orders: A Framework for  
Analysis and Research
Robin Luckham* and Tom Kirk†
stability
This paper reframes the security and development debate through fresh theoretical lenses, 
which view security as highly contested both in the realm of politics and in the realm of 
ideas.1 For some analysts security concerns political power, including the use of organised 
force to establish and maintain social orders and to protect them from external and inter-
nal threats. For others it is about how individuals and communities are protected (or pro-
tect themselves) from violence, abuse of power and other existential risks. We integrate 
both approaches whilst placing our focus on the deep tensions between them. Combining 
them is especially apposite in the hybrid political orders of conflict-torn regions in the 
developing world – where the state and its monopoly of violence are contested and diverse 
state and non-state security actors coexist, collaborate or compete. 
 We ask what security in these hybrid contexts looks like from below, that is from the 
perspective of “end users”, be these citizens of states, members of local communities or 
those who are marginalised and insecure. What are their own vernacular understandings 
of security, and how do these understandings link to wider conceptions of citizen and of 
human security? Even when security and insecurity are experienced and decided locally, 
they are at the same time determined nationally and globally. It is at the interfaces 
between local agency, state power and global order that the most politically salient and 
analytically challenging issues tend to arise. 
 To analyse these interfaces we focus on three interconnecting political spaces, each 
characterised by their own forms of hybridity, in which security is negotiated with 
end-users: (i) “unsecured borderlands” where state authority is suspended or violently 
challenged by alternative claimants to power or providers of security, including non-
state armed groups; (ii) “contested Leviathans”, that is state security structures whose 
authority and capacity to deliver security are weak, disputed or compromised by special 
interests; and (iii) “securitised policy spaces” in which international actors collaborate 
to ensure peace and fulfil their responsibility to protect vulnerable end-users in unse-
cured regions. In making these distinctions we argue that similar analytical lenses can 
be turned upon international actors in securitised policy spaces as well as upon state 
and non-state security actors.
 The concluding section argues that such a reframing of the security and develop-
ment debate demands not just new modes of analysis but also fresh approaches to 
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The Changing Landscape of Security 
Analysis and Policy
The realist conceptualisation of security, 
which views security largely through the eyes 
of the state, whilst still enormously power-
ful, has lost its earlier monopoly over secu-
rity thinking. Since the end of the Cold War a 
new liberal security mainstream has emerged 
whose referent objects – the things to be 
secured – are not confined solely to the secu-
rity of states, their institutions and borders.2 
Security is viewed increasingly as an enti-
tlement of citizens and human beings. The 
aims of security have also been broadened to 
encompass a more diverse range of dangers 
and threats, including issues of human rights 
and emancipation, freedom from want, the 
prevention of infectious diseases and the 
management of climate change. Moreover, 
security is not necessarily obtained even 
when states consider themselves to be at 
peace, as in conditions of authoritarian rule, 
social injustice or structural violence. 
The reframing of security fits within the 
wider paradigm of a liberal world order 
and a liberal peace. It features bold asser-
tions about the interdependence of security, 
development and human freedom (United 
Nations 2004, 2005). The United Nations 
has officially endorsed “human security” 
and the “responsibility to protect” (ICSS 
2001) as guiding principles of international 
conduct. The World Bank too has brought 
security firmly into the development policy 
mainstream. Its World Development Report 
2011: Conflict, Security and Development has 
embraced the concept of “citizen security”, 
linking it to conflict management and pov-
erty reduction (WDR 2011). It focuses not 
just on armed conflict but also on political 
and criminal violence, seen as a continuum. 
And it contends that insecurity and violence 
are negatively correlated with the institu-
tional capacity and accountability of states 
and their elites. The fact that the World Bank, 
as the premier multilateral development 
institution, has been launching itself ‘into 
the grubby universe of real-world politics’ 
(Watts 2012:116) may be as significant as the 
substance of the arguments themselves. 
Yet the liberal mainstream by no means 
constitutes as radical a departure from the 
realist vision as it could. The WDR 2011 
remains firmly within a state-centred policy 
framework. It insists on building legitimate, 
inclusive and capable institutions, with “good 
enough” governance as the preferred policy 
solutions to citizen insecurity, although it 
sees them as a long-term exercise, which 
needs not follow Western models. 
Even if states are no longer seen as the sole 
guarantors of security, political stability and 
international order, they are still given centre 
stage. Since 9/11 the emphasis has turned 
increasingly to the stabilisation of insecure 
regions and “fragile states”.3 Human security 
and the responsibility to protect have been 
invoked to justify armed interventions and 
stabilisation missions in countries as diverse 
as Somalia, Afghanistan, the DRC, Sierra 
Leone, Timor-Leste and Mali. The intracta-
bility of conflicts within such countries has 
reinforced a long-term shift in security doc-
trine towards counterinsurgency and asym-
metric warfare rather than conventional wars 
between states. Counterinsurgency in turn 
has placed development, the protection of 
civilians, political solutions and the reform of 
state security sectors at the forefront of mili-
tary doctrine and practice – further blurring 
the line between security and development.4
However, within the liberal policy main-
stream one finds surprisingly little serious 
interrogation of the concept of security itself 
and of how, by whom and with what politi-
cal agendas security issues are framed and 
security functions are exercised.5 Discussion 
of human and citizen security has largely 
research designed both to provide insights into the vernacular understandings, coping 
strategies and potential agency of end-users and to uncover the informal networks, 
alliances and covert strategies of the multiple actors determining their security in 
hybrid political orders.
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by passed the problem of political power, 
including the various ways in which even lib-
eral security paradigms uphold or are upheld 
by prevailing power relations. Thus, in prac-
tice, security still tends to be treated as politi-
cally non-controversial, with much research, 
analysis and policy focused on technical solu-
tions to current security challenges. 
This applies even to the World Bank’s oth-
erwise promising portrayal of citizen secu-
rity, as ‘both freedom from violence and 
freedom from fear of violence’ – construed 
very broadly to include ‘security at home, in 
the workplace, and in political, social, and 
economic interactions with the state and 
other members of society’ (WDR 2011: xvi). 
Conceptualized in this manner, security is an 
entitlement of individuals which can in prin-
ciple be measured in terms of indicators of 
reduced violence and, under the still wider 
umbrella of human security, other forms of 
vulnerability. The gathering and analysis of 
such evidence is used to facilitate large-n 
cross-country comparisons as well as to pro-
vide evidence-based evaluation of stabilisa-
tion, aid and development programmes. 
Yet the concepts of human and citizen 
security struggle to capture security’s con-
textually contingent meanings in fluid and 
complex multi-levelled regional, national 
and local contexts. They fail to acknowledge 
how security arrangements stabilise existing 
inequalities. And they do not pay enough 
attention to the ways those who clothe their 
actions with the mantle of international, 
human or citizen security may in reality 
damage the safety, livelihoods and welfare of 
many poor and vulnerable people.
The silences in the theory and practice of 
security are particularly problematic in hybrid 
political orders, where insecurity is unseen, 
easily hidden or unquantifiable, where the 
entitlements of citizenship are not extended 
throughout a population, where the state is 
not the primary actor mobilising to provide 
public goods and, furthermore, when govern-
ance arrangements benefit some but exclude 
others, including the poor, vulnerable and 
marginalised. They are more problematic 
still when security discourse and practice is 
monopolised by those with power, be they 
authoritarian states, insurgent groups, occu-
pying forces or development agencies. 
These conceptual gaps easily translate into 
ambiguity and confusion when research-
ers and policy-makers try to operational-
ize human and citizen security. They have 
resulted in widely divergent vocabularies and 
aims, even amongst those operating within 
the same research and policy communities. 
Vulnerable people and groups tend to be 
homogenised within weak empirical cat-
egorisations, obscuring the political power 
hierarchies and global processes which make 
them insecure.6 In consequence they are 
liable to be treated as subjects of prevailing 
security arrangements rather than as agents 
with varying capacities to influence, respond 
or resist.7
Securitisation and the Critical Turn
The elevation of human and citizen security 
into the security mainstream has come at a 
time when the wider vision of a liberal world 
order is increasingly challenged. First, it is 
being made redundant by the emergence 
of new global centres of power and profit in 
East Asia and elsewhere that challenge the 
very foundations of the post-World War II lib-
eral consensus. Second, the limitations of lib-
eral interventions have been cruelly exposed 
by events on the ground in a variety of differ-
ent regional and national contexts, including 
Iraq, Afghanistan, the DRC, Libya and Syria. 
Third, human and citizen security have come 
under scrutiny by a critical security litera-
ture, which questions both the theoretical 
and the policy foundations of liberalisation 
and, in particular, of liberal peace-building 
(Selby 2013).
The main thrust of these critiques is 
encapsulated in the concept of “securitisa-
tion”: the idea that far from contributing to 
equitable development and the welfare and 
safety of vulnerable people, liberal interven-
tions carried out in the name of human or 
citizen security have merely provided nor-
mative and policy cover for new forms of 
global hegemony. Duffield’s (2001) Global 
Governance and the New Wars: The Merging 
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of Development and Security has been espe-
cially seminal. He and other analysts have 
turned the critical lens of securitisation vari-
ously upon the enterprises of international 
development, humanitarian assistance, gov-
ernance reform and state-building (Booth 
2005; Chandler 2006; Richmond 2009; Mac 
Ginty 2011). Despite its promising steps, 
they argue human security is largely silent 
on the aid and security arrangements which 
prop up the liberal peace. Indeed, as one of 
their number suggests, human security can 
be depicted as the dog that has not barked 
(Chandler 2008a). 
Although offering varying takes on securiti-
sation, critical analysts see it as an important 
aspect of an overarching hegemonic enter-
prise instituted after the Cold War and suf-
fused by ideas of Western economic and polit-
ical liberalism. However they contend that 
Western humanitarian intervention, state-
building and development initiatives differ 
significantly from previous imperialisms in 
being conducted in the name of the inter-
national community. This includes not only 
powerful states but also the entire panoply 
of international organisations, international 
financial institutions, aid agencies and global 
civil society organisations. The “new aid pro-
gramme” promoted by international coali-
tions, it is argued, is an innovative and subtle 
form of “power-knowledge” paying lip-service 
to development as progress and to universal 
entitlements, including human and citizen 
security. The international actors at the fore-
front of this agenda have tended increasingly 
to favour indirect engagement (Chandler 
2008b; Veit 2010). At the same time the dis-
course of “local ownership” has allowed them 
to deny formal responsibility, especially when 
interventions generate more insecurity than 
they prevent or bear heavily upon vulnerable 
people (Chandler 2000, 2006). 
Analysts utilising the lens of securitisa-
tion have offered a useful antidote to liberal 
understandings of security but have not for 
the most part provided their own alternative 
definitions of security. They have tended to 
discount the motives and values of interna-
tional actors, as well as to underestimate the 
extent to which values of democracy, human 
rights and humanitarianism have gained real 
traction in parts of the developing world 
(Weiss 2000; Davidson 2012). They have over-
played the coherence of the securitisation 
project and underestimated the conflicts 
and tensions between the major political, 
military and humanitarian players in global 
and national security marketplaces (Selby 
2013). In so doing they have come perilously 
close to reducing national and local actors to 
bit-players in a global game. They have also 
suffered somewhat from the Cassandra syn-
drome, tending to downplay empirical evi-
dence of improvements in peace and security 
globally, as well as in individual national con-
texts like Mozambique, Sierra Leone or Libe-
ria (HSR 2011; Pinker 2011). Thus far they 
have been much more effective as critics of 
the current liberal orthodoxy than in propos-
ing credible alternatives. 
Nevertheless, critical security analysis 
has inspired a new stream of analysis and 
research. It offers a nuanced view of vio-
lent conflict, seeing it not only as an obsta-
cle to development but also a potential site 
of social and political innovation (Cramer 
2006). Moreover it explores the hybrid pro-
cesses that characterize governance in many 
supposedly fragile (Rotberg 2002) states and 
suggests that the meaning of security is con-
tingent upon the contexts within which it is 
constructed. Hence it challenges researchers 
to empirically investigate security from the 
perspective of end-users, including those 
who are most vulnerable and insecure. 
Rethinking the Two Faces of 
Security 
To summarise the discussion above, although 
security remains a highly contentious con-
cept, it is also a highly necessary one. More 
rigorous definitions of security are needed 
than those currently on offer by the realist 
and liberal mainstreams or by most of their 
critics. These definitions should help unpeel 
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security’s multiple layers of meaning and 
grasp its contested character, notably in the 
complex political terrains of supposedly frag-
ile or conflict-affected political spaces.8 
Our definitions start from the assertion 
that security derives its normative force from 
the idea that public power is used to protect 
not just the state but also its citizens along 
with those deprived of the benefits of citizen-
ship, including marginalised minorities, refu-
gees and displaced persons. In other words, 
the bedrock of state security is citizen and 
more widely human security. Accordingly 
we distinguish between two competing yet 
interlinked conceptualisations of security. 
The first of these is on the supply-side, 
having long historical roots in the theory 
and practice of the modern nation state. 
According to this conceptualisation secu-
rity can be seen as a process of political 
and social ordering established and main-
tained through authoritative discourses 
and practises of power, including but not 
confined to organised force.9
Although security thus involves ‘seeing 
like a state’ (Scott 1998), in the hybrid politi-
cal contexts of the modern world security 
resides, along with political authority, within 
a much wider array of global, national and 
local power structures and security arrange-
ments. Security in this view is achieved 
through the exercise of power, especially but 
not solely military power. In an information-
rich world it also depends increasingly on 
surveillance and on control of new media. 
That is, the processes of social ordering that 
produce security can operate in parallel 
with states as well as within them, in some 
instances complementing state authority 
while in others competing with it.
However, reducing security to the crea-
tion and maintenance of political and social 
order is analytically incomplete. It risks iden-
tifying security with ‘the imposed silence 
and normalised quiet of power’ common 
to authoritarian regimes or criminal orders 
– that is, with enforced stability rather than 
true security.10 
Accordingly, a second demand-side con-
ception of security holds that security is an 
entitlement of citizens and more widely 
human beings to protection from violence 
and other existential risks including their 
capacity in practice to exercise this entitle-
ment.11 As such it is dependent upon the 
social contexts, cultural repertoires and 
vernacular understandings of those who 
are secured. 
This vision of security stems from contem-
porary international development, humani-
tarian and human rights concerns. Re-con-
ceptualising security as an entitlement opens 
the way to challenges to the state’s power 
and monopoly of security provision in those 
instances where it fails to protect or indeed 
actively harms its own citizens. It focuses 
assessments of security provision squarely 
on ideas of legitimacy, popular consent and 
political authority. We also see it as related 
to but somewhat distinct from existing for-
mulations of human and citizen security in 
focusing on the vernacular understandings 
of the people and groups who are secured – 
that is, how they experience, understand and 
respond to their own security and insecurity. 
In broad terms one can say that supply-side 
security provision, including state security, is 
needed to assure political order; but in doing 
so it often stands in conflict with the views 
and entitlements of those who are secured. 
Analysis, therefore, should focus simultane-
ously on the web of relationships between 
political and social orders, and on the entitle-
ments between individuals and groups. 
How the tensions between the two are 
negotiated is central to empirical enquiry. 
This distinguishes our own approach from 
both the realist and the liberal traditions 
of security thinking. It encourages further 
analysis of the many ways security is cre-
ated and maintained through authoritative 
discourses and practices of power; together 
with the great variety of actors and organisa-
tions contending and cooperating to estab-
lish structures of public authority. And it is 
especially pertinent in situations of on-going 
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conflict, political violence or difficult demo-
cratic or post-conflict transitions, where sev-
eral actors, some state, some non-state and 
some global, struggle to appropriate and in 
some cases change the definition, ownership 
and distribution of security. 
Our dual definitions are meant to prompt 
questioning of the assumption that security 
is a public good necessary for development. 
Security, unlike development, tends to be a 
discourse of order and risk-avoidance rather 
than of change and transformation. Yet it is 
also commonplace to argue that domestic 
security and political order are prerequisites 
for development. Our understanding allows 
for deep tensions between the two norma-
tive goals. Where indeed security has become 
the sole governing principle of state policy, 
as in the national security states of mid-20th 
century Latin America or until recently most 
states of the contemporary Middle East, it 
may actually harm development and reduce 
the safety and welfare of citizens (Sayigh 
2003; Imbusch 2011).
We thus see security and insecurity as 
inseparable from the exercise of political 
power; security is itself politically contested, 
sometimes violently. Because security like 
other public goods has an almost unmatched 
symbolic prestige, the power to create new 
and shape existing security and justice insti-
tutions is intimately bound up with the polit-
ical processes central to state making and 
state breaking (Tamanaha 1992: 205).12 Thus 
security provision tends to be fought over by 
those wishing to gain or establish political 
authority – especially in fragmented states 
such as Afghanistan, where regional strong-
men compete amongst themselves and with 
the state to attract national and international 
resources. Those who deliver security assert 
and protect their mandates to use force or 
threats of force, as well as to maintain sur-
veillance and gather intelligence about those 
considered a risk to public order. As a conse-
quence, security provision easily merges into 
the deep state, becoming hostage to paral-
lel political agendas and establishing for-
cibly defended “states of exception” – even 
within institutions like refugee camps sup-
posedly devoted to protecting those at most 
risk from insecurity (Hanafi and Long 2010). 
For this reason the mandates of security 
and justice institutions, their accountability, 
their observance of the rule of law and their 
respect for the rights of citizens have tended 
to become paramount policy issues in all 
political orders. 
However, when we emphasise that secu-
rity is an entitlement of end-users we share 
common ground with current conceptions 
of human and citizen security.13 Despite their 
flaws, these conceptions have a genuine cut-
ting edge, especially when security arrange-
ments protect inequalities of power, status 
and wealth, be they global, within states or 
inside and between local communities. We 
argue that the benefits of security provision 
tend to accrue disproportionately to wealthy 
and powerful individuals, institutions and 
states and that its cost tends to be largely 
borne by the poor, vulnerable and excluded 
(Korf 2004; Fluri 2011). By emphasising that 
security is an entitlement we also stress the 
potential agency and voice of end-users, 
including their capacity to protest, mobilise 
around their rights and hold accountable 
those responsible for delivering security. 
At the same time, by focusing upon author-
itative discourses and practices of power, we 
emphasise that security is tied up with deep 
issues about political rights, entitlements 
and obligations. In principle, those who 
deliver security should have credible and 
legitimate mandates based ultimately upon 
the consent of those secured (i.e., end-users) 
or their political representatives. In practice, 
however, end-users tend to regard the claims 
made upon them by states and social orders 
as authoritative to the extent that they deliver 
tangible benefits on an everyday basis. Thus 
it is especially important to restore providers’ 
legitimacy in situations where the mantle of 
national security has been used to justify 
repression and rights abuses committed by 
authoritarian regimes facing fundamental 
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challenges to their authority, as in Burma, 
Libya or Syria. Questions of legitimacy also 
compromise security where governments are 
too weak or captured by special interests to 
be able to protect all or some of their citi-
zens, as in Mali or, in the context of sectarian 
conflict, as in Pakistan. They are also highly 
salient where the supposed requirements of 
regional or international security are used to 
paper over local systems of occupation and 
repression, as in Afghanistan or Palestine 
(Hanafi 2010). They can even arise in estab-
lished democracies and quasi-democracies 
when the requirements of national secu-
rity are wheeled in to justify harsh security 
measures in insecure regions like Northern 
Ireland, Kashmir or Chechnya. 
Finally, in rejecting a purely state-centred 
approach we focus instead on the real nature 
of security arrangements, including their 
varied links to political authority below, 
within and above the state.14 The governance 
of (in)security, especially in conflict prone 
and post-conflict states is “multileveled” 
(Cawthra and Luckham 2003; Baker 2010; 
Leonard 2013). It involves complex arrays of 
international, state and non-state actors who 
variously cooperate and compete for power 
and resources and who determine patterns 
of security and insecurity. Thus the actors 
and institutions mobilised to deliver secu-
rity (and sometimes insecurity) range from 
(a) the primarily global, such as the United 
Nations, international peacekeepers, private 
military companies or transnational mili-
tant movements, to (b) the mainly national, 
including national security and justice insti-
tutions as well as the national governments 
and legislatures to which they are accounta-
ble and to (c) the mostly local, including civil 
society, traditional leaders, business commu-
nities and community security and justice 
bodies. Even more controversially, actors that 
operate beyond the rule of law and are often 
considered illiberal by Western paradigms, 
such as warlords, cartels, paramilitaries, mil-
lenarian cults, anti-globalisation movements 
and mafias, cannot be omitted since they can 
in some situations be considered agents of 
security as well as of insecurity (Reno 1999; 
Goodhand and Mansfield 2010).
Why “Hybrid” Security 
Arrangements?
The analysis of security outlined above calls 
into question what Foucault (1980: 78–133) 
terms the ‘sovereign’ view of power that 
lies behind state-centric analysis including 
much security thinking (von Torotha 2009).15 
Instead we find it more helpful to place our 
focus on the multiple sites of political author-
ity and governance where security is enacted 
and negotiated. Here we draw upon the 
emerging literature on hybrid political orders 
(HPOs), which highlights the varied and con-
textually contingent nature of political power 
and security arrangements, especially in con-
flict-affected, transitioning and post-conflict 
contexts (Boege at al 2009; Richmond 2009; 
Mallet 2010; Mac Ginty 2011). 
While previous accounts of state fragility 
have concentrated on how predation, cli-
entelism, and neopatrimonialism weaken 
public authority and “hollow out” or “crimi-
nalise” the state (Rhodes 1994; Bayart, Ellis, 
and Hibou, 1999; Chabal and Daloz 1999; 
Rotberg 2010), analyses of hybridity are 
less inclined to leap to conclusions about 
state fragility or failure, and less inclined 
to see this as a one-way process (Call 2008). 
Rather they focus upon the multiple ways 
traditional, personal, kin-based or clientelis-
tic logics interact with modern, imported 
or rational actor logics in the shifting his-
torical conditions of particular national and 
local contexts. 
Though the processes they focus upon may 
be presented in terms of the interactions 
between the formal and informal actors, 
analyses of HPOs seldom restrict hybridity to 
this distinction alone (Kraushaar and Lam-
bach 2009). Rather HPOs tend to be charac-
terised by multiple providers of security, wel-
fare and representation, as the state shares 
authority, legitimacy and capacity with many 
other actors, networks and institutions (Lam-
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bach 2007; Wennmann 2011). Indeed the 
real holders of political power and provid-
ers of public goods, including security, may 
have little allegiance to the state or may not 
even subscribe to the “idea of the state” itself 
(Abrams 1988; Hansen and Stepputat 2001). 
The HPOs literature has developed a com-
plex and sometimes confusing vocabulary, 
which characterises hybridity in terms such 
as “legal pluralism”, “twilight institutions”, 
”mediated” and”negotiated” states (Griffiths 
1986; Menkhaus 2006/7; Lund 2007; Hag-
mann and Peclard 2010). These conceptu-
alisations suggest that public authorities in 
fragile regions, including institutions of the 
state, wax and wane as governance arrange-
ments are never definitely formed but are in a 
constant process of reproduction, negotiation 
and flux (Lund 2007). Moreover they argue 
that the providers of public goods, includ-
ing security, enjoy different levels of access 
to power and authority, and, in some cases, 
occupy positions in multiple political orders; 
be they local, national or international.
This broad understanding of hybridity 
de-naturalises stereotypes of the state and, 
by extension, other forms of public author-
ity. It proposes that governance should be 
empirically investigated as a collection of 
loosely coordinated and constantly chang-
ing processes. However, given its intellectual 
roots in subaltern history and anthropology, 
hybridity does not denote the mere grafting 
together of separate actors and institutions 
to make new entities (Mac Ginty 2011: 8). 
Rather it directs attention towards the ‘(re)
negotiation and transformation’ or ‘unmak-
ing’ and ‘remaking’ of political orders (Mallett 
2010: 67–72). Such an approach repositions 
state-building paradigms within ‘transition 
logics’ that focus on the processes and inter-
actions creating and sustaining functioning 
public institutions, be they of the state or of 
other political entities (Wennmann 2011: 4). 
Concerns with the variety of ways public 
authority is negotiated in hybrid contexts 
are also beginning to influence the policy 
literature on state-building and security 
provision, focusing it upon inclusivity (DFID 
2010; OECD 2011; Carpenter, Slater and Mal-
lett 2012). For instance the WDR 2011(xvii) 
stresses the importance of close understand-
ing of particular national and regional con-
texts. It draws upon the literature on “politi-
cal settlements” and “limited access orders” 
to argue for ‘collaborative, inclusive-enough 
coalitions’ which ’restore confidence and 
transform institutions and help create con-
tinued momentum for positive change’ (Di 
John and Putzel 2009; North et al 2012). 
Nevertheless the WDR 2011 is somewhat ret-
icent about the political processes through 
which these coalitions might be formed; nor 
does it lay down clear criteria by which one 
might decide empirically that such coalitions 
are inclusive enough to ensure broad secu-
rity provision. Its attempts to pull together 
a wide array of empirical scholarship to sup-
port its assertions about the links between 
narrow elite pacts, weak institutions and 
cycles of violence do not completely con-
vince, even at times doing ‘violence to the 
scholarship itself’ (Watts 2012: 120). 
Moreover governance practitioners are 
enjoined to seek ‘local legitimacy’ and 
involve ‘broader segments of society—local 
governments, business, labour, civil society 
movements, [and] in some cases opposition 
parties’ (WDR 2011: xvii). Donors are left to 
consider ‘how best to manage, exploit, and 
coexist with [HPOs]’, and help public author-
ities ‘to provide human and national security 
to their populations’ (Clunan and Trinkunas 
2010: 12). In a similar manner, the OECD’s 
International Network on Conflict and Fra-
gility (INCAF) has called for deeper under-
standing of HPOs (OECD 2011: 25), arguing 
that such societies:
continue to function, to form insti-
tutions, to negotiate politically, and 
to set and meet expectations. Tradi-
tional forms of authority are not nec-
essarily inimical to the development 
of rules-based political systems […] In 
fact, the challenge is to understand 
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how traditional and formal systems 
interact in any particular context, 
and to look for ways of constructively 
combining them.
In many respects working with hybridity, like 
decentralisation before it, appeals to actors 
from diverse ends of the political spectrum 
(Lutz and Linder 2004). For the left it accords 
with the embedded, participatory and com-
munitarian aspects of governance assistance 
programmes. For neo-liberals it suggests 
state functions can be outsourced, moving 
power away from inefficient or corrupt cen-
tral governments. It also attracts those frus-
trated by the failure of numerous post-Cold 
War state-building and security sector reform 
projects in conflict affected countries, par-
ticularly where the centralisation of security 
repeatedly leads to predation. A hybridity 
lens has even been adopted by some security 
analysts to interpret the blurring of irregular 
and regular threats they encounter in ‘asym-
metric warfare’ on contemporary as well as 
ancient battlefields (Killcullen 2009; Murray 
and Mansoor 2012). 
In sum the notion of “working with the 
grain” of hybrid processes has been har-
nessed for quite different normative goals, 
be they basic service provision, liberal state-
building, the promotion of democratic pro-
cesses, the free market or the defeat of an 
adversary (Booth 2012: 84–86). Unsurpris-
ingly this apparent looseness has opened 
the concept of HPOs, and in particular 
hybrid security arrangements, to a number 
of critiques. 
Some analysts contend that the HPOs 
approach risks swapping the state fragility 
literature’s essentialist focus on the defi-
ciencies of the state with a ‘celebration’ of 
potentially chaotic, regressive and violent 
forms of governance beyond the margins 
of the state (Meagher 2012: 1077). In par-
ticular, it is suggested that a rush to embrace 
the traditional can blur the true nature of 
the relationship between localised orders 
and legitimacy, or, even more dangerously, 
deploy Tillyan notions of state formation to 
apologise for violence.16 Moreover a concen-
tration on hybridity may lead to an overem-
phasis upon the negotiability of governance 
arrangements and foreclose robust empirical 
investigation of existing power structures 
(Doornbus 2010). Critics even fear that ana-
lysts, who see hybridity everywhere, may 
disregard the existing tensions and divisions 
in fragmented governance contexts more 
accurately described by the concept of “insti-
tutional multiplicity’ (Goodfellow and Linde-
mann 2013). 
These are useful warnings. Like all open-
ended analytical concepts (as we have seen 
security is another), hybridity is vulnerable to 
a variety of constructions, critiques and mis-
interpretations.17 Furthermore, it is useful 
only if it raises fruitful questions for analysis 
and empirical investigation. Indeed we pre-
fer it over alternatives such as institutional 
multiplicity precisely because it highlights 
the complex interplay among multiple and 
often contradictory forms of social order-
ing, each having their own sources of power, 
distinct organisational logics and sources 
of legitimacy.18 We also argue that hybridity 
should not be seen as a concept in search of 
a pleasing theory of the traditional. Rather it 
is an analytical lens that explicitly challenges 
reductionist positions by focusing on the 
interactions that make talking of, let alone 
reverting to, supposedly traditional govern-
ance arrangements impossible. Later in this 
paper we turn the same analytical lenses not 
only upon local level security arrangements 
but also upon the political spaces controlled 
by national elites and global security actors, 
both of which are far from homogeneous, 
being tugged in different directions by a 
diversity of political and security actors, each 
with distinct agendas, ways of operating and 
political alliances. 
To be sure, we argue that hybrid politi-
cal contexts tend to be permeated by deep 
contradictions and clashes between differ-
ent ways of organising security and political 
power. These clashes may become violent, 
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especially in situations of major insecurity, 
contested political authority or armed inter-
national intervention. But violence is neither 
inherent nor necessary, either for security 
or in order to drive the slow, locally embed-
ded processes of political centralisation 
that some see as essential to state-building. 
Rather, the presence or absence of violence, 
and how it is organised or resisted, remain 
empirical issues for investigation in particu-
lar national and local contexts. 
In sum, the main value of a hybrid approach 
to security is its emphasis on empirically 
grounded investigations that uncover how, 
and for whom, security is determined in com-
plex, multilayered political contexts. Indeed 
it brings together a supply-side approach to 
the determination of security by a variety of 
security actors, with a demand-side empha-
sis upon inclusive security based upon the 
agency of end-users. Thus the approach 
can help analysts understand the infor-
mal networks and political spaces in which 
end-users voice protest against or withhold 
cooperation from illegitimate institutions, at 
the same time as it reveals networks which 
threaten their rights or worsen insecurity. 
Through such a lens realistic appraisals of 
the “weapons of the weak” become every bit 
as essential for understanding security provi-
sion as analysis of the political powers of the 
strong (Scott 1985).
Webs of (In)Security: A Multi-Level 
Approach
As already suggested, hybrid interactions 
between actors and institutions occur across 
as well as within national and local bounda-
ries. Security arrangements tend to be deter-
mined at multiple levels both on the demand 
side and on the supply side. Webs or chains of 
security and of (in)security stretch from the 
global to the national to the most local levels 
and back.19 The lives and survival strategies of 
end-users, in particular poor and vulnerable 
people, often depend upon remote national 
and global processes over which they have 
no control and upon powerful actors who 
are in no way accountable for the misery and 
insecurity they may cause. Conversely both 
global and national decision-makers often 
find themselves disconcerted by seemingly 
local upheavals, which generate wider con-
flicts and insecurities: what some security 
analysts term “blowback”. 
Below we turn our focus upon three 
types of political space, within which these 
webs of (in)security tend to interconnect, 
namely: “unsecured borderlands”, “contested 
Leviathans” and “securitised policy spaces”. 
Although they span the local, the national 
and the global, we see them as being mutu-
ally constituted, not merely as separate lev-
els of analysis. However we are deliberately 
selective in our focus on these particular 
political spaces rather than others and, fur-
thermore, in confining our discussion to the 
primary decision-makers active within them 
(rather than all possible actors determining 
local (in)security). As our dual definition of 
security attests, this focus should not be 
taken to imply that end-users have no agency. 
Rather it acknowledges that their agency and 
experience of security in each space may be 
constrained by other more obviously power-
ful actors and dynamics. 
While our treatment of the global and 
the national may seem to take us rather far 
from our original concern with the vernacu-
lar understandings and lived experience of 
end-users, we think it can be justified: end-
users are not only entangled in networks 
across local and national boundaries, they 
sometimes have a surprisingly acute under-
standing of how they are put at risk by wider 
national and global insecurities. Inevitably 
trying to look at security “from below” (Luck-
ham 2009) is something of a thought experi-
ment. It is not made any the easier by the 
fact that so much of the literature sees secu-
rity through the eyes of states and powerful 
global actors. One way of turning the tables 
upon the latter is to scrutinise their policies 
and programmes through the same hybridity 
lenses that researchers turn upon local actors 
in the developing world.
1. Unsecured borderlands are spaces 
where state authority is suspended or 
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violently challenged by alternative claim-
ants to power and providers of security, 
including non-state armed groups. These 
borderlands are unsecured since they fall 
outside the security umbrella of the state; 
but they are not necessarily insecure. They 
can be configured around both social exclu-
sions and geographical divisions (Goodhand 
2009). Often they traverse established state 
boundaries. But they may also take the form 
of unsecured spaces inside existing states.
Examples are the borderlands between 
Pakistan and Afghanistan (White 2008) and 
between Indian and Pakistani-controlled 
Kashmir (Aggarwal and Bhan 2009), the 
troubled peripheries between eastern DRC 
and its Great Lakes neighbours (Raeymaek-
ers 2010), the porous border areas between 
Sudan and Northern Uganda, the Somali-
speaking region that traverses Somalia, 
Somaliland, Ethiopia and Northern Kenya 
(Simonse 2011) and the militarized border 
areas between Lebanon, Syria, Israel and 
Palestine. Sometimes the entire de jure ter-
ritories of states like Somalia (Menkhaus 
2006/7), Haiti, Central African Republic or, 
arguably, Yemen can be seen as unsecured 
borderlands. National parks too can share 
a number of the characteristics of border-
lands, in some instances functioning as safe 
areas, but in others becoming unpoliced or 
unpoliceable spaces, as in rebel-penetrated 
parks in the Great Lakes region of Africa 
(Dunn 2009).
However there are important differences 
among borderlands, including distinctions 
between those where borders themselves 
are porous and unpoliceable, as between 
Pakistan and Afghanistan, and those where 
boundaries within peripheral regions are 
militarily enforced but where state author-
ity is routinely ignored or contested, as in 
Indian-controlled Kashmir or Palestine. In 
neither case can regional borderlands be 
regarded as political voids. Often there exist 
well-organised security links between states 
and non-state actors across national bounda-
ries, such as those between Iran, Syria and 
Hezbollah in Lebanon or those between Paki-
stan’s military intelligence apparatus and the 
Taliban in Afghanistan. 
Not all unsecured borderlands are situated 
across or adjacent to national boundaries. 
The salient borders may be largely or wholly 
interior and may be characterised by deep-
seated horizontal inequalities, ethnically or 
religiously polarized identities, or geographi-
cal patterns of urban and rural exclusion. 
Examples are Northern and Eastern Sri Lanka 
(Goodhand, Klem and Korf 2009), parts of 
Gujarat in India (Berenschot 2009), the Niger 
Delta in Nigeria, areas exposed to Maoist vio-
lence in Nepal (Bohara, Mitchell and Nepal 
2006), Baluchistan in Pakistan or the Oromo 
and Somali regions in federal Ethiopia. 
Exclusions may be even more local still, 
including political and social spaces where 
the writ of the state does not extend or 
which suffer significant state and non-state 
violence, for instance Palestinian refugee 
camps in Lebanon (Hanafi and Long 2010), 
urban slums like the Cape Flats in Cape Town 
(Burr 2008), the outskirts of Karachi (Khan 
2010) or favelas in Rio de Janeiro (Dowdney 
2003). Indeed securitized border spaces can 
be found even in otherwise stable and well-
governed countries as in India’s Jammu and 
Kashmir (Aggarwal and Bhan 2009) or North-
ern Ireland.
Yet far from being ungoverned, such bor-
der spaces tend to have their own hybrid 
forms of political regulation, often involv-
ing violence alongside complex interactions 
among various armed groups. There can also 
be multiple articulations with the ‘absent’ 
state, among neighbouring states and with 
global players. Certainly one cannot in truth 
say states are absent in places like Pakistan’s 
Federally-Administered Tribal Areas, Darfur 
or Kashmir (on either side of the Line of Con-
trol); they are very coercively present. 
Unsecured borderlands are particularly sali-
ent contexts to examine how poor and vul-
nerable people themselves think about and 
experience security (Richards 1996; Lorenco-
Lindell 2002; Allen 2012). They poignantly, 
sometimes brutally, expose the vast gaps 
between the way academic and policy analy-
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sis frames security and lived experience of 
those at the receiving end of insecurity. Even 
the concepts of human and citizen security 
do not come close to conveying the vernacu-
lar understandings and hidden “transcripts 
of resistance” of people at grass-roots (Scott 
1985). Indeed it is doubtful if the term “secu-
rity” itself can be translated. Approximations 
can be found; Acholi people in war-torn 
Northern Uganda distinguish between ‘bad 
surroundings’ (piny marac) and ‘good sur-
roundings’ (piny maber) (Finnström 2008). 
However such terms are imbued with cul-
tural resonances all of their own, as well as 
being open to change and reinterpretation 
as violent events transform local realities.
Using different methodologies, Uvin and 
Finnstrom study grass roots perceptions of 
security in Burundi (Uvin 2009) and North-
ern Uganda (Finnström 2008). Both con-
clude that most people do not make sharp 
distinctions between freedom from vio-
lence, social peace and the ability to meet 
basic needs, including the ability to move 
freely from place to place. Both suggest that 
local people tend to have more complex, 
less judgemental understandings of armed 
groups than national elites or international 
actors. And both seem to endorse the senti-
ments of a respondent in Finnstrom’s (2008: 
12) study, that ‘the silence of guns does not 
mean peace’.
At the same time unsecured borderlands 
tend to be highly gendered spaces, in which 
gender subordination interlinks with other 
exclusions (Saigol 2010). Coulter challenges 
stereotypical accounts of women as victims 
in her study of girl soldiers and bush wives 
in Sierra Leone, as do Abdullah, Ibrahim and 
King in their analysis of women as civil soci-
ety activists and peacemakers (Coulter 2009; 
Abdullah, Ibrahim and King 2010). Neverthe-
less Coulter (2009: 10) observes ‘women’s 
choices in times of conflict and war are at 
best circumscribed, at worst non-existent’. 
Hybrid or informal security and justice 
institutions in unsecured borderlands are 
sometimes regarded as credible alternatives 
to failing, corrupt or oppressive state secu-
rity provision. They are, however, incredibly 
diverse, including traditional justice institu-
tions, local defence forces, community polic-
ing bodies (Baker 2008), paramilitaries, pri-
vate security companies, assorted vigilante 
groups (Buur 2008; Meagher 2007) and 
community-led peace initiatives (Colak and 
Pearce 2009). Isima’s (2007) study of non-
state security provision in Nigeria and South 
Africa suggests there may be contradictory 
relationships between informal security 
provision and “civil militarism”, when pro-
viders alternate between being protectors 
and oppressors of poor and vulnerable peo-
ple. Indeed informal institutions are seldom 
impartial, having their own political and eco-
nomic agendas, some pursued through vio-
lence. Those relying on traditional authority, 
like the Arbakai in Afghanistan, can be patri-
archal and reinforce local inequalities (Tariq 
2009), while privatised security provision 
may be market-driven and biased towards 
those with wealth and power (Isima 2009). 
Furthermore, where outlawed groups pro-
vide much needed security and justice, they 
often do so at the expense of due process 
and respect for rights and the rule of law. 
Conversely, in some situations, as with para-
military formations in Darfur and Southern 
Sudan, they may act in collusion with the 
state in repressing both armed resistance 
and unarmed protest (Ylonen 2005).
Yet in different circumstances narratives of 
subaltern resistance to economic exploita-
tion, state repression or foreign occupation 
may be harnessed to wider transformative 
agendas. Wood’s historical and ethnographic 
analysis of peasant revolt in El Salvador offers 
a persuasive account of insurgent collective 
action within struggles for land and social 
justice (Wood 2003). Others explore how 
popular movements and civil-society groups 
can pose alternatives to violence, as with civil 
society organisations and agrarian conflict in 
Guatemala (Van Leeuween 2010), Afghani-
stan’s often overlooked activists (Theros and 
Kaldor 2011) and the resistance of Colom-
bian communities to guerrilla as well as state 
violence (Alther 2006).
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Yet one cannot assume that the hidden 
transcripts of dissent, still less armed resist-
ance, are progressive. Indeed, where insur-
gents mobilise submerged ethnic, national or 
religious identities, even in support of wider 
goals of national liberation or social justice, 
they often create new forms of exclusion and 
violence, as for instance studies of the Tali-
ban have shown (Fleischner 2011; Rangelov 
and Theros 2012). Moreover, a well-recog-
nised feature of successful armed struggles is 
the betrayal of the hopes of many of those 
who supported them: the 2006 violence in 
East Timor (Nixon 2012) and the well-docu-
mented peacetime reversals of gains made 
by women in armed insurrections are cases 
in point (Coulter 2006; Hale 2008).
In sum, whilst it is critical to understand 
hybrid security provision and the ways it 
can fulfil unmet security and justice needs, 
a strong dose of realism – based on detailed 
empirical research into how informal mecha-
nisms function, for whom they work and 
what tangible benefits, if any, they provide to 
end-users – is necessary. 
2. Contested Leviathans are states and 
state security structures whose author-
ity and capacity to deliver security are 
weak, disputed or compromised by the spe-
cial interests that tend to predominate in 
HPOs. They are so termed in order to cap-
ture the contingent and disputed nature of 
state authority in many national contexts. To 
call such states “fragile” can be something of 
a misnomer, however, since even the most 
challenged retain considerable powers to 
coerce or watch over their citizens. Moreover, 
their primary security institutions (the armed 
forces, intelligence apparatuses, police and 
judicial systems) matter enormously for the 
rights and security of citizens, even when 
in the main they act as agents of insecurity 
rather than security. 
At the extreme end of the spectrum stand 
states whose capacity to exercise any form of 
legitimate authority, nationally or locally, is 
severely diminished or non-existent. In large 
parts of Somalia or eastern DRC (Renders 
2007; Kaiser and Wolters 2012), for instance, 
almost all semblance of public authority has 
vanished; state power is highly contested 
and geographically fragmented in Lebanon 
(Mac Ginty 2011); and in Afghanistan it faces 
prolonged armed resistance (Goodhand and 
Sedra 2010). Yet none of these countries, 
even Somalia, can be written off as ungov-
erned and ungovernable political spaces 
(Leonard and Samantar 2011). 
Empirical analysis is not best served by 
hammering such states into a single theo-
retical mould of state fragility. Their categori-
sation as “fragile” or “failing” has often been 
after the event, only following major state 
crises or outbreaks of violence. Seldom has 
there been much serious ex ante analysis of 
their susceptibility to breakdown. Moreo-
ver it is striking that some states currently 
considered fragile were once considered 
developmental success stories, like the Ivory 
Coast, Zimbabwe or (before the genocide) 
Rwanda.20 
The Arab Springs seemed to challenge 
what we knew, or thought we knew, about 
the closed or oligopolistic political market-
places of many authoritarian and quasi-dem-
ocratic regimes. While such regimes deploy 
impressive capabilities for political coercion 
and surveillance of their citizens, sometimes 
penetrating deep into civil society as in states 
like Syria, Burma, Sudan, Yemen or Pakistan, 
the apparent centralisation of power has not 
been all that it seems. Rather as the former 
President of Yemen expressed it ruling ‘is like 
dancing on the heads of snakes’ (ex-President 
Ali Abdullah Salih quoted in Clark 2010: xi). 
Hence we suggest turning the analytical lens 
of hybridity upon apparently more durable 
state Leviathans as well. 
First, state power and security may in prac-
tice be negotiated with major independent 
social sectors, like Islamist groups in Paki-
stan, Lebanon, Sudan or Egypt, or cartels 
in Mexico, Colombia and Peru. Second, the 
central institutions of the state itself may 
in reality be hybrid in their own right, with 
formal chains of command and account-
ability penetrated and even superseded by 
informal patronage networks and systema-
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tised corruption. Indeed, as in Syria, Iraq, 
Libya, ex-Yugoslavia, Zimbabwe and others, it 
is often state elites themselves who deploy 
personal, ethnic or religious ties to cement 
their regimes and control their military and 
security apparatuses. 
This informalisation of power tends to be 
a double-edged sword, consolidating the 
power of state elites within patronage struc-
tures but also weakening public authority 
and the state’s capacity to deliver security 
and other public goods. In times of crisis it 
can also generate acute political tensions in 
the heart of the state itself, rendering appar-
ently fearsome state machines and their 
security apparatuses suddenly vulnerable. 
This is especially so where, as during the 
Arab Springs, state elites lose control over 
information to new media and where their 
monopoly of force is challenged by new 
forms of popular unarmed and armed resist-
ance on the streets. 
Yet the resilience of the deep state should 
not be underestimated either. Security elites 
tend to act as power and profit maximiz-
ers, translating their control of security and 
organized violence into personal or insti-
tutional gain within national, regional and 
global political marketplaces (North et al 
2012). They may even work to mould demo-
cratic governance around their own security-
dominated vision of the polity, as in Central 
America’s post-conflict democracies. “Politi-
cal armies” and security institutions almost 
invariably continue to be major players, even 
in transitional or democratic regimes (Luck-
ham 1996; Koonings and Kruijt 2004). A 
particularly graphic example of the baleful 
influence of security services under a ‘vio-
lence called democracy’ has been Guatemala 
(Schirmer 1998; Goldman 2007). Even less 
explored by researchers has been the politi-
cal consolidation of unaccountable security 
sectors under “states of emergency” in the 
securitised border spaces of Colombia, Sri 
Lanka or India (not only in Kashmir but also 
in areas contested by Naxalite insurgents) – 
bringing down the wrath of the state upon 
embattled minorities and economically and 
socially excluded regions.
Despite a wealth of useful insights, the 
policy and academic literatures on the sta-
bilisation of fragile states tend to remain 
couched in the restricted language of state-
craft. Moreover they barely touch upon the 
deep politics of reform, draw upon the criti-
cal literatures on the state and on HPOs or 
empirically investigate how security is actu-
ally delivered to end-users. Only latterly 
has more critical and empirically grounded 
attention been turned upon the real poli-
tics of stabilisation (Collinson, Elhawary and 
Muggah 2010), post-conflict security reform 
(Hutchful 2009; Sedra 2007; Peake, Scheye 
and Hills 2009) and day-to-day policing and 
justice in conflict and post-conflict situations 
(Baker 2010), including the activities of what 
Baker (2002) terms ‘lawless law enforcers’, 
who may in practice be the only recourse of 
poor and vulnerable people seeking a modi-
cum of safety and justice. 
Over three decades ago a classic study by 
Enloe (1980) focused upon how colonial and 
post-colonial elites framed security policy 
around the manipulation of ethnic and reli-
gious identities. More recently attention has 
turned to how fragile states and predatory 
elites thrive upon durable disorder (Chabal 
and Daloz 1999), merging state security insti-
tutions with the parallel networks of HPOs. 
Nevertheless there has not been enough seri-
ous empirical investigation of how they and 
their security apparatuses contribute to, and 
extract advantage from, such disorder, either 
nationally (as in Burma, Zimbabwe and argu-
ably now Iraq and Syria) or within marginal-
ized border regions (like Darfur, Abyei and 
Kofordan in Sudan) – nor of the ways durable 
disorder touches on the lives of those who 
are threatened or excluded. 
There is also a distinct shortage of detailed 
micro-analysis of the invisible faces of power 
and security, including the intelligence and 
surveillance systems often at the heart of 
contested Leviathans. As Tadros (2011) has 
shown for Egypt, state security apparatuses 
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are often parallel powers in their own right, 
interconnecting with corporate and political 
interests and penetrating deep into civil soci-
ety. Research on these apparatuses in Latin 
America has analysed how they perpetuate 
legacies of impunity, rights abuses and social 
exclusion – even in supposedly democratic 
or ‘post-conflict’ states (Schirmer 1998). 
There have been calls for ‘pragmatic real-
ism’ both about the prospects of security 
reform (Scheye 2009) and about post-war 
stabilisation more generally (Colletta and 
Muggah 2009). The empirical foundations 
for such a pragmatic approach are spelt out 
in case studies of the politics and practice of 
security sector reform (Cawthra and Luck-
ham 2003; Hendrickson 2008; Peake, Scheye 
and Hills 2009). Most of these case studies, 
however, tell the story of reform and the 
political obstacles it encounters from the 
viewpoint of the reformers themselves rather 
than that of the end-users whom the reforms 
are supposed to benefit. 
Existing analysis has been notably weak on 
how dysfunctional security institutions can 
be challenged or held accountable by end-
users living in conditions of insecurity. Fur-
thermore we have little understanding of the 
how citizen demands for change emerge and 
catalyse a reordering of the political and secu-
rity landscape. For his part, Hattotuwa (2009) 
has drawn attention to how new media have 
kept open spaces for political debate in the 
security-dominated political environment of 
post-conflict Sri Lanka, as well as engaging 
with grass roots audiences in vernacular lan-
guages. Furthermore, Somaliland is widely 
cited as a paradigm case of citizen action and 
peacebuilding from below. Yet it remains a 
special case and it is far from clear that its les-
sons are transferable to other conflict-torn or 
fragile states, where as we see below peace-
building largely been driven by international 
rather than local actors and agendas. 
3. Securitized policy spaces are policy 
arenas in which international actors 
(peacekeepers, donors, international agen-
cies, INGOs etc) intervene to ensure peace 
and security, claiming to act for poor and 
vulnerable end users as well as for the inter-
national community. Our central conten-
tion is that interventions by members of the 
international community are characterised 
by their own forms of hybrid politics, which 
warrant similar analytical lenses to those 
turned upon national and local actors. Scru-
tinised through these lenses, security provi-
sion is globally and historically constituted 
(Ayers 2010); and the welfare and security of 
end-users all too often take second place to 
geopolitical concerns, inter-agency rivalries 
and patron-client relationships. Even when 
intervening for humanitarian goals, inter-
national actors rapidly become entangled 
in hybrid relationships with powerful, and 
sometimes destructive, national and local 
actors. Good intentions are no protection 
against the perverse and sometimes violent 
consequences of international engagement.
As we have seen, the WDR 2011 tackles the 
political dimensions of peacebuilding and 
security reform. Yet it remains very difficult to 
translate its analysis into sound operational 
guidelines for international engagement in 
the bad surroundings of fragile states. More 
broadly the distinct historical trajectories 
by which states and regions become fragile 
or insecure, or are ‘stabilized’ or opened to 
reform, are all too often glossed over. Nor 
indeed has there been enough recognition of 
the major differences in the scale, types and 
impacts of international engagement, rang-
ing from the relatively limited policy support 
for security and justice reforms in countries 
such as Nigeria, Uganda, Rwanda, Ethiopia or 
Nepal, to the wholesale reordering of entire 
states and their security institutions under 
the rubric of stabilisation as in Afghanistan, 
Iraq, Bosnia, Kosovo, Haiti, East Timor, Libe-
ria or Sierra Leone (see the typology of exter-
nal post-conflict engagement in Luckham 
2011: 98–106). 
The policy literature tends to view peace-
building through the interventionist gaze 
of the international community, rather than 
through the lenses of national, let alone 
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grass-roots stakeholders. This top-down per-
spective is reflected in analyses which attrib-
ute the success or failure of peacebuilding 
variously to the sequencing of reform (Paris 
2004), to inability of donors and interna-
tional agencies to coordinate policies and 
act with a single voice (Toft 2010), inherent 
tensions between humanitarian and mili-
tary action and a lack of local ownership and 
absence of political will. Although no doubt 
important, these issues do not sufficiently 
address deep contradictions inherent in the 
international enterprise of peacebuilding 
itself (e.g. Paris and Sisk 2009; Collinson, 
Elhawary and Muggah 2010; Gordon 2010; 
Lothe and Peake 2010). 
Policy analyses of interventions have 
tended to edit out the political interests and 
calculations of the major players, including 
the international ones. Yet experience shows 
that stabilisation and the prioritisation of 
security can easily become counterproduc-
tive in situations of highly contested political 
authority, large-scale violence and external 
military intervention, especially where stabi-
lisation merges into counter-insurgency as in 
Afghanistan and Iraq. Thus the international 
community remains open to the charge that 
its humanitarian aid and development assis-
tance, and still more its sponsorship of secu-
rity sector reform (SSR) and stabilisation pro-
grammes, have been securitized or driven by 
foreign policy agendas. 
An emerging stream of critical analysis 
has turned its attention to the links between 
the liberal peace and stabilisation agendas 
(Chandler 2006; Pugh, Cooper and Turner 
2009; Richmond and Franks 2009), as well 
as to the cooptation of both by the war on 
terror (Keen 2006; Howell and Lind 2009). 
A major contribution of these approaches is 
to frame external actors as objects of study - 
rather than taking their policy agendas as the 
starting point for inquiry. Accordingly the 
entire assemblage of external actors who are 
active in unstable regions are characterised 
as international “regimes” or indeed HPOs in 
their own right (Mac Ginty 2011; Veit 2010). 
Veit even characterizes the complex relation-
ships in eastern DRC between representa-
tives of the international community, local 
elites and armed groups as a new trope in the 
old colonial narrative of indirect rule. 
The priorities and animating logics of the 
different protagonists – peacekeeping forces, 
aid bureaucracies, humanitarian agencies, 
international NGOs etc – differ and some-
times clash (Bagayoko and McLean Hilker 
2009). Yet one finds little detailed empirical 
enquiry into how bureaucratic timetables, 
funding requirements and inter-agency rival-
ries determine the workings of stabilisation 
policies or SSR programmes. There is even 
less empirical study of the relationships of 
such policies and programmes to the agen-
das of military alliances, large powers, and 
global corporations. Moreover relatively 
few studies have focused upon relation-
ships between international interveners and 
national and local security actors. Beginning 
to fill these gaps, Autesserre’s (2010) study of 
peacebuilding in the DRC is one of the first 
anywhere to approach the messy and violent 
real politics of relationships peacebuilders 
and local armed actors.
In recent years significant shifts in global 
security marketplaces have had major con-
sequences for the capacity of the interna-
tional community to ensure security within 
the contested spaces of fragile or shadow 
states (Nordstrom 2000). These shifts have 
included developments in the commerce in 
weapons and other conflict goods and ser-
vices (Cooper 2002), including the expansion 
of privatised security provision (Abrahamsen 
and Williams 2009), the commercialisation 
of conflict resources, including the erosion 
of the distinction between lootable and non-
lootable resources like oil (Le Billon 2012; 
Kaldor, Karl and Said 2007) and, above all, 
the trade in destructive “illicit” commodities 
such as drugs in countries like Afghanistan, 
Colombia, Mexico or Guatemala (Briscoe 
and Rodriguez 2010). Illicit or shadow mar-
kets have even begun to reconfigure entire 
states, as seen dramatically in eastern DRC 
or Guinea Bissau, which are transit points in 
the drugs trade between Latin America and 
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Europe. They have also brought new actors 
into the security frame, including criminal 
mafias, diaspora networks, international 
security firms, natural resource corporations 
and even international NGOs (Avant 2005), 
all impacting in various ways upon vulner-
able people and communities.
There are many ways in which develop-
ments in global and regional security mar-
ketplaces have spread violence and under-
mined peacebuilding. Examples include: 
(i) the enormous difficulties of regulating 
poppy production and trade and of break-
ing its links to warlordism and insurgency 
in Afghanistan (Goodhand and Mansfield 
2010); (ii) the illicit trade in coltan and 
other high-value commodities in the DRC, 
which have impeded the creation of a viable 
national economy and provided incentives to 
sustains criminal and political violence (Kai-
ser and Wolters 2012); (iii) the problems of 
implementing security and justice reforms 
where resource or drug-induced corruption 
penetrates deep into security agencies, as in 
Mexico, Colombia or even Ghana; or (iv) the 
undue influence that international security 
firms have in civilian protection programmes 
or SSR in countries like Iraq, Afghanistan or 
Liberia (Leander 2001).
Moreover international actors in donor-
saturated spaces confront major issues of 
accountability, above all in relation to end-
users in host countries and local communi-
ties. Donors, international humanitarian 
actors and NGOs are accountable primarily 
to their own governments, agencies, funders 
and stakeholders, not to end-users in host 
countries and local communities. In other 
instances, international actors such as global 
security firms, dealers in illicit or high-value 
commodities, arms traders, natural resource 
corporations, criminal mafias or networks 
of religious militants may be accountable to 
non-state authorities such as shareholders 
or faith communities; in others they may be 
answerable to no one at all. Yet none of them 
are accountable in any way to end-users. 
Indeed the latter not only have few means 
of redress against those exposing them to 
violence, exploitation and rights abuses – be 
they state security agents, warlords, armed 
militants, criminals or indeed intervention 
forces; they have almost none against those 
supposed to protect them, such as peace-
keepers, international agencies, donors, 
humanitarian bodies and NGOs, when they 
fail to deliver on their responsibility to pro-
tect or become complicit in their exploitation 
and abuse (Mamdani 2009).
By Way of Conclusion: Some 
Challenges of Research from an 
End-User Perspective
Our analysis above has presented a frame-
work for evaluating security from an end-
user perspective. This demands not only 
in depth local-level research but also the 
ability to turn an end-user lens upon the 
global, regional and national power rela-
tions which determine the security of poor 
and vulnerable people. Below we briefly 
sketch some challenges of implementing 
such a research agenda. 
The first challenge is to tap end-users 
own vernacular understandings of how 
they navigate the terrains of violence and 
seek security in unsecured borderlands. A 
few researchers have provided vivid and at 
the same time analytically focused accounts 
of how particular groups navigate insecurity. 
These include, for instance, Coulter’s (2009) 
research on girl soldiers and ‘bush wives’ in 
Sierra Leone and Vigh’s (2006) account of 
young urban fighters in Guinea-Bissau, both 
of which include perceptive accounts of their 
methods of research. Others have combined 
more structured surveys with ethnographic 
techniques or historical sources to good 
effect, including Uvin’s (2009) research on 
perceptions of war and peace in Burundi 
and Wood’s (2003) analysis of grass-roots 
insurgency in El Salvador. Some of the best 
research indeed has not announced itself as 
being “about” conflict and insecurity per se 
but has rather generated insights about the 
latter indirectly, as for instance in Coburn’s 
(2011) ethnographic study of power and the 
pottery trade in an Afghan town and Hutch-
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inson’s (1996) examination of the Nuer’s 
relationship to cash, guns and the Suda-
nese state. Paige’s (1997) innovative use of 
ethnography, surveys and historical politi-
cal economy analysis to interpret relations 
between coffee elites and violence in three 
Central America countries may also be put in 
this category.
Approaching end-users from another 
perspective, a number of research initia-
tives challenge the received wisdom that it 
is impossible to do large scale or rigorous 
research in conflict affected regions (Jus-
tino, Leavy and Valli 2009).21 Some of these 
utilise large time series livelihood or house-
hold surveys designed to understand end-
users perspectives of public goods provision, 
including security and justice, and the every-
day outcomes of conflict for different social 
groups. Although the drive for large-n data 
sets is arguably spurred by donors’ need to 
make “business cases” for development inter-
ventions, the possibility of combining these 
with further, historically and contextually 
nuanced, methodologies presents an exciting 
prospect for future understandings of secu-
rity provision and everyday life in HPOs.22 
However we argue in a companion piece 
on our literature searches (Luckham and Kirk 
2013) that, in aggregate, existing studies still 
tend to be geographically scattered, themati-
cally and methodologically diverse, and in 
many cases lacking in empirical rigour. One 
cannot extract firm empirical or policy con-
clusions without greater conceptual integra-
tion and sharper empirical focus on (a) who 
precisely end-users are, (b) to whom they look 
for protection, (c) how far they have capac-
ity to influence or indeed frustrate formal 
policy structures and agendas and (d) when 
instead they turn to informal security and 
justice providers, protests or violent revolts. 
Moreover, vernacular understandings must 
still be placed in historical context, including 
the processes of uneven development, social 
exclusion and political violence, which have 
rendered unsecured borderlands peripheral 
and their inhabitants insecure. 
In sum, mapping end-users’ vernacular 
understandings of hybrid security arrange-
ments demands a combination of methodo-
logical innovation, historical understanding, 
empirical rigour and willingness to enter 
their social worlds and respect their agency 
(on the challenges of research in violent 
contexts see McGee and Pearce 2009 and 
Cramer, Hammond and Pottier 2011). The 
bulk of existing studies deploy the standard 
techniques of ethnography and participatory 
research. They can with profit be supple-
mented by creative use of a wider repertoire 
of research techniques, such as: (a) the pre-
viously mentioned integration of qualitative 
methods with quantitative surveys; (b) math-
ematical modelling of social networks; (c) the 
use of life histories alongside documentary 
sources to record local-level social change; 
(d) accessing the resources of poetry, fiction23 
and the mass media to draw on the popular 
imagination; (e) deploying the crowd sourc-
ing techniques which have shown their effec-
tiveness in preventing outbreaks of electoral 
violence in Kenya and elsewhere (Bott, Gigler 
and Young 2011; Mancini 2013); or (f) using 
blogs and SMS messages to ensure a voice 
for the excluded in documenting their own 
experiences of abuse and insecurity, as in Sri 
Lanka (Hattotuwa 2009). 
Analytical innovation too can sharpen the 
tools of empirical inquiry to better serve 
end-users, drawing for instance on the “sub-
altern” perspective of post-colonial histori-
ans, or on Scott’s (1985) analysis of the weap-
ons of the weak. Our point is not that these 
analytical perspectives should be wheeled 
in simply to place the focus on the agency 
of those who have been made insecure. It is 
that the premises as well as the techniques 
of research on security from below are in 
need of rethinking. 
A second challenge is how to undertake 
empirical archaeology of the informal 
security relationships within and around 
the state. How and for whom do they work 
or fail to work? We have seen how durable 
disorder is endemic in HPOs, with diverse 
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forms of political authority coexisting and 
competing over how and by whom security 
is defined and provided. As Stepan (1988: 
ix-xv) argued in a seminal analysis of demo-
cratic strategies towards security apparatuses 
during the Latin American transitions of the 
1980s, rendering the deep state transparent 
is a truly major research challenge. Secrecy 
is not just endemic, it is the way the state 
works, as well as the way it shields its benefi-
ciaries from prying eyes. Even in seemingly 
consolidated autocracies, such as Syria and 
Libya prior to the current upheavals, patron-
age networks of family, clan, ethnicity and 
religious confession criss-crossed state and 
security structures, holding elites together 
but also dividing them and linking them to 
wider political alliances beyond the state, 
which often descended to grass roots. 
Mapping such networks is crucial to deter-
mine if elite and elite-mass coalitions are 
‘inclusive enough’ (in the World Bank’s ter-
minology) to manage emergent conflicts and 
ensure the security of end-users. It may also 
diagnose the tension points in the edifices 
of power that can open spaces for change or 
render state structures vulnerable to major 
shocks and upheavals. However it is very 
hard to penetrate the deep state and the 
clandestine social networks and patronage 
systems within it. Added to this are the risks 
to researchers own safety and their respon-
sibilities towards their informants. Yet even 
the most fearsome state Leviathans are not 
completely monolithic. Opportunities can 
open for research in the most unexpected 
places, especially at moments of political cri-
sis, when the unravelling of political author-
ity opens new windows for inquiry. 
Researchers can construct reasonably 
convincing accounts of the deep state and 
of its informal networks of power through 
the gathering and triangulation of scraps of 
information from a variety of non-obtrusive 
measures and indirect data sources; even if it 
is not always easy to ensure that such a bri-
colage meets rigorous research standards.24 
Researchers can draw upon and learn from 
organisations, such as the International Cri-
sis Group, which have documented political 
violence and human rights abuses in many 
national contexts. Investigative journalists 
too have much to teach them. Goldman’s 
(2007) The Art of Political Murder, for instance 
uses the murder of an archbishop in Guate-
mala as the starting point for a far-reaching 
inquiry into the activities of the country’s 
security agencies, their links with paramili-
tary and criminal groups and the struggles 
of human rights groups and social activists 
to hold them accountable. Furthermore it is 
possible to use the resources of new media 
to gather information about political spaces 
that are difficult or dangerous to enter. A 
recent study of internet censorship in China 
shows how researchers can even extract sali-
ent conclusions from the state’s own efforts 
to close down spaces for debate and criticism 
(King, Pan and Roberts 2013). 
A third research challenge is to lay bare 
the webs of causality and of accountability 
linking poor and vulnerable people to the 
international actors who in various ways 
determine their (in)security. As we have 
seen the literature on the securitisation of 
development focuses in general terms on 
the globalised nature of the security arrange-
ments entangling the developing world. 
Critical scholars such as Mamdani (2009) 
have argued persuasively that the inter-
national community bears a major share 
of the responsibility for the humanitarian 
disasters, such as that in Darfur. However 
their case needs to be backed by more rig-
orous research (especially from an end-user 
perspective) on how donors, international 
organisations and international NGOs actu-
ally navigate the terrains of war and the shift-
ing security marketplaces of troubled states 
and unsecured borderlands. 
There has been some progress, as we have 
seen, from the initial normative concerns 
of the literature on security and develop-
ment towards more empirically grounded 
analysis of the real politics of international 
engagement: for instance (amongst oth-
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ers) the studies put together by Peake, Sch-
eye and Hills (2009) on field experiences 
of security reform; the work of Hutchful 
(2009) on SSR in peace agreements; or 
Collinson, Elhawary and Muggah’s (2011) 
scrutiny of stabilisation policies. There have 
also been detailed accounts of the interface 
between international and local security 
actors in particular national contexts, for 
instance the work of Autesserre (2010) and 
Veit (2010) on the DRC. The latter’s analy-
sis of how international actors fall back 
upon colonial tropes of indirect rule and 
are thereby drawn into hybrid relationships 
with politicians and warlords scrutinises 
both international and local actors through 
the same analytical lenses. 
Policy-makers often grumble that the social 
research that arrives on their desks does not 
address their most pressing policy concerns. 
Researchers for their part complain that pol-
icy-makers disregard their findings by pursu-
ing quick policy fixes in situations of great his-
torical and social complexity. Acknowledging 
this complexity can help international actors 
to identify and minimise the potentially 
regressive outcomes of their interventions. 
More crucially it could potentially provide 
those at the receiving end of interventions 
with evidence-based analysis with which to 
hold international actors accountable. How-
ever end-users cannot hope to hold policy-
makers (or indeed researchers themselves) to 
account without more access to the research 
upon which the framing of policy is based. 
They also need empirical inquiry that reflects 
their own concerns, including better under-
standing of how and by whom their security 
is determined.25
Despite an expanding research literature, 
security in HPOs remains such an acutely 
contested area that firm empirical conclu-
sions are rare, especially about how security 
touches on the lives of poor and vulner-
able people. Research, like policy, has been 
skewed by the inequalities inherent in the 
theory and practice of security itself. We hope 
that this article will encourage researchers to 
pay greater attention to the capabilities and 
concerns of those whom the prevailing secu-
rity architectures have left out or failed.
Notes
 1 This paper builds upon a systematic lit-
erature search undertaken by the Justice 
and Security Research Programme (JSRP) 
at the London School of Economics (LSE) 
funded by the UK’s Department for Inter-
national Development (DFID). The search 
itself and its main findings are discussed 
in Luckham and Kirk (2012) and Luck-
ham and Kirk (2013). 
 2 The argument that security is not con-
fined to the security of states predated 
the end of the Cold War (Palme 1982; 
Buzan 1983; Luckham 1983). During the 
1990s it was mainstreamed through the 
concept of human security (UNDP 1994; 
Ogata and Sen 2004; Tadjbakhsh and 
Chenoy 2007; Jolly and Basu Ray 2007; 
Kaldor 2007). 
 3 State fragility, state-building and stabili-
sation are the focus of a substantial offi-
cial literature; (OECD 2009; DFID 2010). 
For an excellent critique and analysis of 
the implications for development and 
humanitarian policy see; (Collinson, El-
hawary and Muggah 2010).
 4 The US Army/Marine Corps’ (2009) Coun-
terinsurgency Field Manual remains the 
most authoritative official statement. 
 5 There is of course an entire academic sub-
field of critical security studies, referred to 
later in this paper. But it has had little im-
pact on mainstream research, still less on 
policy discussion. The ‘Security in Transi-
tion’ research programme at the LSE is ex-
amining the discourses and policy papers 
of powerful international actors to un-
derstand what it terms the ‘security gap’. 
http://www.securityintransition.org/ 
[Last accessed 17 August 2013]
 6 These receive some discussion in the 
WDR 2011 but are neither confronted 
head on nor linked to its main policy con-
clusions and recommendations.
 7 Both Ogata and Sen (2004) and Tad-
jbakhsh and Chenoy (2007) build human 
Luckham and Kirk: The Two Faces of Security in Hybrid Political Orders Art. 44, page 21 of 30
capabilities into their analyses, but do 
not relate them to security governance. 
 8 The essentially contested nature of secu-
rity was highlighted by Buzan (1983). See 
also; (Smith 2005; Luckham 2007, 2009).
 9 This definition is distinct from but con-
sistent with ‘realist’ accounts of interna-
tional relations. It draws from analyses 
of the making, unmaking and remaking 
of political orders and states; (Hunting-
ton 2006; Tilly 1985, 1990; Bates 2010; 
North, Wallis and Weingast 2009).
 10 Edward Said quoted by Nadine Gordimer 
(2011).
 11 This definition draws heavily upon Sen 
(1981, 1999). See also endnote 2 above. 
Nevertheless we emphasise the contested 
and contextually contingent nature of 
entitlements.
 12 See also the sources in endnote 8.
 13 See the sources in endnote 2.
 14 de Sardan (2009), Researching the Prac-
tical Norms of Real Governance in Africa 
contrasts ‘real governance’ – how states 
are really managed, public policies actu-
ally implemented and public goods actu-
ally delivered to the normative ideals of 
‘good governance’ promoted by develop-
ment agencies.
 15 See Foucault’s (1980) ‘Two Lectures’ and 
‘Truth and Power’ where he argues that 
power is diffused through multiple sites 
rather than hierarchically concentrated, 
enacted rather than possessed and dis-
cursively constituted through ‘regimes of 
truth’ rather than purely coercive. 
 16 Tilly’s famous notion of ‘state formation 
as organised crime’ portrays violence as 
a tool for populations to hold abusive 
authorities to account and drive a slow, 
locally embedded process of political cen-
tralisation. See: Tilly (1985).
 17 The accusation of privileging violent 
forms of social ordering simply does not 
apply to influential formulations of hy-
bridity, such as Boege et al (2009) which 
focuses, for instance, on the activities 
of clan elders etc. in building peace and 
democratic governance in Somaliland 
– contrasting them with the more unre-
sponsive methods of international peace-
builders in countries like Timor-Leste. 
 18 For recent discussions of local legitimacy 
that acknowledge its diverse sources see 
the Journal of Intervention and State-
building, 7 (1) (2013), special issue on 
Peacebuilding, Statebuilding and Local 
Legitimacy.
 19 These metaphors have political and ana-
lytical ramifications. ‘Webs’ implies that 
security is co-constructed at the global, 
national and local levels. ‘Chains’ implies 
that social actors are imprisoned within 
coercive global, national and local rela-
tionships - although some economists 
use the term ‘value chains’ to analyse the 
international division of labour.
 20 Since the genocide Rwanda has re-estab-
lished its credentials as an effective de-
velopmental state, despite still presiding 
over a potential political time-bomb.
 21 For instance, see the work of the House-
holds in Conflict Network (Verwimp, Jus-
tino and Bruck 2009), of the DFID funded 
Secure Livelihoods Research Consortium 
and of the JSRP. Also see The Asia Foun-
dation’s surveys on perceptions of justice 
and security governance in countries such 
as Timor-Leste, Pakistan and Afghanistan. 
 22 However Watts’ (2011:118–120) critique 
of the WDR 2011’s use of large-n stud-
ies serves as a useful reminder about the 
limitations of such research in politically 
contested situations..
 23 In societies like Afghanistan and Somalia 
poetry has enormous cultural resonance, 
notably in dealing with issues of war and 
peace: on the political dimensions of So-
mali poetry and literature see Hoehne 
and Luling (2010: Part V). Writers like 
Nuruddin Farah in Somalia or Aminatta 
Forna in Sierra Leone provide insights 
into the raw realities of political violence 
and conflict, which social scientists fail 
to capture. 
 24 A good example is Cawthra’s (1986) de-
construction of the apartheid war ma-
chine put together largely from careful 
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assemblage of existing documentary 
sources. Others include Luckham (1971) 
and Schirmer (1998), although not focus-
ing directly on how military and security 
establishments interface with end-users..
 25 International development organisations 
and major donors are increasingly pub-
lishing the individual research findings 
which go into major reports. For instance 
the WDR 2011’s background papers can 
be found online.
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